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-I. The Arctic
The word "Arctic" comes from the Greek "Artikos" which means "of
the bear."
As early as the fourth century B.C., Greek
astronomers, believing that the world was
round, postulated the existence of a frozen
region of dark winters and sunny summers. The
Big Dipper, Ursa Major (Greater Bear), was the
most conspicuous northern constellation;
therefore, the Greeks referred to thi s reg ion
as 'Arktikos. rl
Webster defines Arctic as "of or relating to the region around
the North Pole to approximately sixty-five degrees north latitude
(actually the Arctic Circle is the parallel of latitude sixty-six and
a ha 1 f degrees nor th of the Equa tor) .,,2
Indicative of the complicated and delicate nature of Arctic
issues, the geographic definitions of the Arctic, varying considerably
and themselves contested among interested parties, do not satisfy
esoteric needs, and broader sui generis definitions are often applied
to the Arctic. "Functionally, the Arctic might be best described in
terms of U.S. political, social, economic, and scientific interests,,,3
or "as those northern regions where human activity, technology, com-
munications, and defense systems require special adaptation to cold
climate, to the presence of ice in its various forms, or to polar
upper atmosphere d i sturbances.,,4
The united States Arctic, for the purposes of this study, en-
compasses the seabed and subsoil under the resource jurisdiction of
1
the onited States, including the Bering Sea offshore, and the Hope
Basin, Chukchi (Barrow Arch) and Beaufort (Diapir Field) Seas, and
land territory north of the Brooks Range onshore.
2 )
(See Figures 1 and
II. The Resource
"Oil is the residue of plants and animals that grew in ancient
oceans, died and sank to the bottom where they were covered rapidly by
sediment that prevented oxidation."S oil is most often found in
marine sedimentary rock faults or other structures. It may be light
or heavy, sweet or sour. Lighter oil such as that found in Texas,
Louisiana, Saudi Arabia, and Iran produces more gasoline, while
heavier oil such as that found in the O.S. Arctic produces less gaso-
line. Oil with a high sulfur content is sour; oil with a low sulfur
content is sweet. Alaskan oil is sour. Hydrocarbon reserve estimates
in the Arctic are very important because of the quality of the oil
(heavy and sour) and the exorbitant cost of exploiting the resource in
the inhospitable O.S. Arctic. The critical question then becomes,
"How much oil is there in the O.S. Arctic?"
Manipulation of resource and reserve estimates using different
definitions for political purposes has caused friction between oil
companies and local, state, and federal governments. The complex
process of estimating hydrocarbon potential in a given area involves a
high degree of uncertainty, especially prior to the digging of ex-
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FIGURE 1. The U.S. Arctic
SOURCE: U.S. Arctic~~nd Gas, NPC, 1981, p. 2.
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U.S. A~ctic Oil and Gas, NPC, 1981, p. 14.
ploratory wells. There are various types of estimates of hydrocarbon
potential which incorporate increasing levels of detail in the data
base with a corresponding increase in the degree of certainty in the
estimate. Characteristics of various types of estimates are shown in
Table 1, and a hydrocarbon resource classification chart is shown in
Figure 3. By using these references, one can intelligently interpret
the oil estimates which follow.
The united States has about five percent of the world's oil
reserves, ranking third in world oil production behind the Soviet
Union and Saudi Arabia. About 8.5 million barrels of oil are produced
in the u.S. daily; however, Americans consume approximately 15
million barrels a day--the difference is imported. Where does the
u.S. Arctic fit into the production scheme?6
Alaska is a state well-known for its oil resources. Net
production of oil in Alaska in 1981 was 586.7 million barrels of
crude, 95% of which came from Prudhoe Bay. Alaska is equal in area to
one fifth of the united States with more shoreline (6,640 miles) and
continental shelf than any other state in the union. The Alaska Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) comprises 74% of the total area of U.S.
offshore lands. Because lI a b o u t 75% of the undiscovered recoverable
oi 1 resources is expected to be found on continental shel ves,1I7 and at
least 50% of the undiscovered recoverable oil resources is expected to
occur in the U.S. Arctic,8 the region figures prominently in the
energy security of the United States. Onshore, north of the Brooks
5
0.
TABLE l-characterUtica 0( tmdi.sco'vered recoverable ruourca, ccntiUonaJ
ruourca, rf3ked reaourca for leaed lands, and reaerves
Undiscovered Conditional Risked resources
recoverable resources resources for leased lands Reserves
• Indicates regional • Developed for the ~IS • A probabilistic aggre- • Enlmated on a reser-
petroleum potential prior to the lease sale galion of tract- voir-by-reservoir basis,
for the entire sale specific estimates after a discovery is made
offering for tracts actually and commercial
leased, but not yet accumulation is
developed established
• Available data utilized • Increased q.Jantity of • Increased q.Jantity • Greater volume of data
are limited data and q.Jality of inf luences interpretations
data derived from weJllogs,
formation tests, core
samples, and actual pro-
duction rates :
• Use of computer simu- • Use of computer lim- • Possible use of computer
lation model ulation ~I programs
• Probabilistic In nature • Probabilistic in
nature
• Heavy reliance on • Heavy reliance on • Heavy reliance on • Based on actual data
knowledgeable but knowledgeable but knowledgeable but collected from drUling
subjective opinion subjective opinion SliIjective opinion _lis, with reliance on
subjective opinion
• Estimates do not • Estimates do not • Estimates consider • Estimates are for
consider the posslbll- consider ti)e possibility the possibility that proven commercial
Ity that the area is that the area is the _ does not accumulations of
devoid of commercial devoid of commercial contain accumulations hydrocarbons
accumulations of oil accumulations of oil of commercial hydro-
and/or las and/or las carbons
SOURCE: Arctic Sum1ll.!EY.. Repo~ Jan. 1983, p . 13.
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Range (including federal lands), the State of Alaska in 1980 estimated
oil resources and reserves to be 10.2 billion barrels. 9 Arctic
offshore resource and reserve estimates, reflected in Table 2, are
equally significant, and the onshore and offshore undiscovered
recoverable oil together make-up a considerable portion of the 150
billion barrels of oil estimated to be recoverable in the United
States using conventional methods.
The Alaskan Arctic then is considered to be one of the most
promising hydrocarbon areas in the united states; however, in a larger
perspective,
.• at current production, the U.s. has the
equivalent of only nine years of oil reserves
left. To counter this rate of depletion, the
united States must discover the equivalent of
three Prudhoe Bays in this decade alone. Yet
most experts fear that few large fields remain
to be found. 10
There is an 88% probability that the U.s. Arctic contains major oil
fields with at least 50 million recoverable barrels of oil and oil-
equivalent gas; however, the geologic features and processes which
make the area so promising are offset by geologic features and
processes which hamper onshore and offshore oil exploration and
development activities. "'A 20 barrel-a-day well just outside Houston
looks terrific,' a major oil company expert said.
8
'In Arctic
".
TABLE 2 -Arctic off3htlre oa cnI gas reaource and ruerve estfmata
Oil
.(billion barrels)
Undiscovered recoverable resources (mean estimates)
(0-200 m water depth)
Gas
(trillion cubic feet)
Beaufort Sea (Diapir Field)
Chukchi Sea (Barrow Arch)
Risked resources
Joint Federal/State Lease Sale
(24 tracts) and
Lease Sale 71 (I2l tracts)
Reserves
Beaufort Sea (Diapir Field)
Chukchi Sea (Barrow Arch)
-.
7.8
3.6
.911
o
o
39.3
13.8
•.510
o
o
SOURCES: 001, 1982c (undiscovered recoverable resources); Wilson, 1982 (risked
resources).
SOURCE: Arctic Summary Report, Jan. 1983, p . 14.
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conditions, a 2,000 barrel-a-day well may not be of much interest., ..ll
The expenses of Arctic oil exploration and production are pheno-
menal, due in part to the fantastic technologies associated with
these activities. To drill an offshore well in the Arctic costs up to
$23 million, ten times what it costs to drill the same well in the
Gulf of Mexico. To pump one barrel of oil in the U.S. Arctic costs
about $31., thirty times what it costs to pump one barrel of oil in
Saudi Arabia. 1 2
In 1973 no one considered the costs of Arctic oil exploration as
important as oil's availability, but the glut of oil resulting from
worldwide recession, conservation, and gains in efficiency has caused
the price of oil to drop, fomenting disagreement among the experts
about the value of the Arctic effort.
For the Arctic exploration effort to make any
sense at a Ll , .. it seems necessary to be 1 i eve
two things: first, that the oil glut--even if
it lasts for the decade--will ultimately be
ended by economic resurgence, geological
limits, and worldwide population growth, and
second, that a major supply disruption, as
occurred twice in the 1970's, has a good
chance of recurring. 1 3
The oil companies evidently believe both these predictions to be true
because they continue to invest in capital intensive Arctic oil
ventures.
The State of Alaska is more wary of such predictions, salting
away a permanent fund against the inevitable day that the oil runs
10
out. Prices have sunk over $5 per barrel since 1981, and the
Department of Energy recently predicted another $5 per barrel decline
by 1985. 14 This means that each barrel of oil passing through the
Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS, See Figure 4) brings less money.
This trend is reflected in the declining oil revenues in Alaska as
shown in Figure 5.
Alaska is being inexorably drained of
petroleum, just as its richest mother lode of
gold was devoured at the turn of the century.
By 1995, production will probably have slipped
to less than half th~ current rate, petroleum
engineers estimate. l
The Department of Energy's survey further predicts that oil
prices wi 11 rise after 1985, but this fact does not brighten the
outlook for Alaskans, becase as early as 1985 Prudhoe Bay production
is expected to drop sharply as the natural difficulties continue and
production costs rise. A lessening of underground pressures that
force oil to the surface has occurred at Prudhoe Bay and will become
aggravated before new fields can be brought into production. Although
OCS oil fields have excellent potential, they will not compensate for
the shortfall in Prudhoe's decline. 16
Currently, companies are paying enormous sums of money to inject
water and gas into rock formations to increase pressure, improve
production techniques, and drill more wells to maximize long term
recovery. The expense of this effort causes later barrels of oil to
11
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Figure 4. Trane Alaska Pipeline System (Redrafted from Arctic Summary
Report, October 1981)
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be far more expensive to produce than earlier barrels. Despite
economies of scale, the sharply rising cost of the marginal barrel of
oil will ultimately make uneconomical any additional efforts to
maximize production. Declining oil prices will expedite this day,
although a price as low as $25 per barrel would justify expenditures
to increase output. 17
The uncertainty of future oil prices increases risks of
exploration, and with profits of the major oil companies declining
(-19.4% in 1983), there is less incentive and less money to invest in
Arctic oil exploration. "There is a distinct slowdown in the avail-
ability of risk money looking for new fields," said Mr. Chatterton,
Chairman of the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. The
reason he gave was that no later than 1988, there will be between a 15
and 20% decline in production, and by 1995 Prudhoe Bay will only be
pumping 120,000 barrels of oil a day as opposed to its present 1.5+
million barrels a day.18
Petroleum revenues, presently accounting for 9/10 of state
spending, will be 70% less in 1984 than predicted two years ago. The
implications for the State of Alaska are alarming: overall employment
will grow 10% more slowly over the next decade than was expected, and
the state income tax will be revived. 19
The persistent oil glut on the West Coast, the principal market
for U.S. Arctic oil, concerns the State of Alaska and the oil
companies. Because of the glut, about half of the oil from the U.S.
14
Arctic must be shipped through the Panama Canal to Gulf and East Coast
refineries which reduces revenues and state and federal taxes. In
March, 1984, Congress considered lifting the Export Administration
Act's ban on the export of Alaskan oil, so that the oil could be
shipped to Japan. The lower transport costs to Japan would raise the
wellhead price of oil, thus increasing the base upon which companies'
llwindfall profits ll are taxed, consequently increasing Treasury
revenues. In an election year where the critical issue might just be
the huge federal deficit, it is no surprise that President Reagan is
bent on lifting the ban. In addition to reducing the huge federal
deficit, exporting oil to Japan would increase allied energy security,
promote free trade, and strengthen allied ties in the Far East.
Despite these benefits, lifting the ban will not be easy. The
American maritime industry and its powerful unions, protected by the
Jones Act which requires shipments between doemstic ports to travel on
American ships, will strongly oppose the move to rescind the ban.
But the climate for such exports seems to have
improved. The united States now imports only
4.3 mi 11 ion barrel s of oi 1 a day, down from
7.3 million barrels a day in 1976. And the
government's strategic petroleum reserve
contains more than 300 million barrels ~f oil,
equivalent to ten weeks of oil imports. 0
The current trend, vocalized by President Reagan at the Williamsburg
Summit in 1983, against protectionism and in favor of free trade in
the world, greatly improves the chances of the ban's being lifted.
15
The quid pro quo possibilities of the Japanese deal further enhance
the likelihood that Congress will life the ban.
III. History
The history of oil exploration in the u.s. Arctic is relatively
young. At the same time prospectors were digging for gold in Alaska,
Arctic oil exploration began with the u.s. Geological Survey's surface
work in 1901. The Gold Rush in Alaska first made Americans aware of
the economic potential of this previously neglected region, and the
petroleum discoveries later heightened that awareness. oil seeps were
found on what is today the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska (NPRA)
in 1904. In 1923, this area was designated the National Petroleum
Reserve Number 4 (NPRA-4). From 1944 to 1953, the u.s. Navy conducted
geological mapping and exploratory drilling in the area. 21
During 1949 and 1950, in an effort to develop
a natural gas fuel supply for the Naval Arctic
Research Laboratory (NARL), the first
development well s were dri lIed and completed
in the U.S. Arctic, proving that hydroca 2bonscould be produced in the Arctic region. 2
Alaska became the forty-ninth state on January 3, 1959.
the poorest state in the union.
The Alaskan economy was conditioned strongly
by the state's frontier stage of development
and its inadequate tax base for state and
municipal growth. High costs of labor and
transportati~n tended to discourage outside
investment. 2
16
It was
For a decade after it was admitted to the Union, Alaska struggled to
bring its economy, in its frontier stages, into the twentieth century.
That economy mirrors the cycles of exploration for petroleum which
have occurred in the u.s. Arctic since 1962. "Each surge in
exploration and in the Alaskan economy can be clearly related to
acreage a vai labi 1 i ty for pri vate industry exploi tation."24 (See
Figure 6)
In 1964, the State of Alaska began leasing land on the North
Slope which was believed to have high hydrocarbon potential. In 1968
the Prudhoe Bay oil field--the largest in the united States--was
discovered. In the early 1970's, the government renewed exploration
of the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska (NPRA); the Arctic Slope
Regional Corporation negotiated leases, and seismic surveys were con-
ducted in the Beaufort Sea in anticipation of lease sales there.
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil exploration became increasingly
important after the 1973 Arab oil embargo. President Reagan and his
Secretary of the Interior, James watt, resolved that the United States
would not allow itself to be blackmailed again.
There were powerful national security reasons
for reducing our dependence on foreign oil,
and with it the risk of blackmail. But with
oil prices stable or declining, there was
little incentive for the large investments
needed for systematic development of
alternative sources of energy--even though it
was all but certain that within the decade the
energy crisis would return. 2 5
17
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secretary Watt provided the missing incentives by opening up virtually
the entire united States' coastline for exploration and exploitation
of its hydrocarbon resources.
Construction of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System began in 1974
and was completed in 1977. The Pipeline System is 789 miles long from
Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic Ocean to Valdez on the Prince William Sound.
It is 48 inches in circumference and came into operation only after
heated controversies among government, industry and environmentalists.
But it too, resulted in surges of exploration. By the end of 1982,
2.5 billion barrels of oil had been extracted from the Prudhoe Bay
field. This field accounts for 20% of the oi 1 produced in the United
States.
From 1977 to 1979, there were increased seismic and drilling
activities prior to the Beaufort Sea OCS, Joint Federal/State Lease
Sale (See Figure 7). An increase in activity prior to the 1982 OCS
sale (Lease Sale 71--see Figure 7A) occurred as expected. Two NPRA
lease sales were held in January and May of 1982, and a third was
conducted in July of 1983, again, with the typical surges in
exploration taking place prior to the sales.
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980
(ANILCA) called for an assessment of the impacts of oil-related
activity in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), 18 million
acres of wilderness in northeastern Alaska. Environmental Impact
Statements were drafted in early 1983, and the surges were again
19
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anticipated because of the expected opening of federal lands (NPRA,
ANWR, and other federal lands in the Central Arctic Area). However,
the replacement of Mr. Watt with Mr. Clark as Secretary of the
Interior may curtail the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons
on federal lands, at least until the Presidential election is over.
Although surges and lapses in oil exploration have been
relatively easy to predict according to availability of land and other
tangible factors in the past, there are too many intangibles to
account for in order to reliably predict future exploration and income
from Arctic oil. Among these variables are the unpredictability of
future oil prices, the nebulous impacts of the oil company mergers on
exploration, the effects of future events in the Middle East on U.S.,
and more importantly, Allied energy security, and a host of other
economic, political, strategic, and environmental uncertainties.
The U.S. Arctic is important for strategic, economic, social,
cultural, scientific, environmental, and political reasons; but, the
degree of its importance is not agreed upon by strategists,
economists, sociologists, anthropologists, scientists,
environmentalists, or politicians. This central issue, still
unresolved, is important because the resolutions of all Arctic
international jurisdictional issues will be ancillary to this one, and
the resolutions proportionate to the degree of importance attached to
the Arctic by governments.
22
The severe nature of the climate and environment, the distance of
the region from the rest of the nation (and the world), and associated
communication and transportation difficulties result in a retarded
pace of activity in any Arctic activity, especially Arctic oil
exploration. Economically, this translates into higher costs and
greater risks on capital investments. There is a tendency, because of
this fact of Arctic life, for those operating in the Arctic (oil
companies for instance) to inflate the importance of the region in the
hopes of attracting government compensation in the forms of funds and
favors which will lead to a more favorable benefit-cost ratio, and
ultimately to higher profits.
On the other hand, those who do not attach much importance to the
Arctic region (the U.S. government for instance), at least ostensibly,
fail to do so for political or paltry purposes shrouded in the
rhetoric of the "New Federalism," to antagonize other littoral states,
or for other ignominious reasons. At the same time the united States
markedly increases their submarine and anti-submarine activities in
the Arctic, they indicate to other littoral states that the Arctic is
just not that important to them--it is not a priority issue in the
Reagan Administration. This anomalous behavior, in the absence of an
Arctic regime, such as the one which functions in the Antarctic,
exacerbates the complex Arctic issues.
Will lithe great graviational power of the American electorate--a
power that always works against radical changes in poli c y"26 work in
23
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the best interests of the U.S. Arctic? The "almost total ignorance on
the part of most laymen other than a handful of Arctic explorers,
scientists, Air Force and Naval specialists, and oil and mineral
prospectors,"27 of the Arctic and its issues leads one to doubt the
wisdom, if not the power, of the electorate in dealing with Arctic
issues. There is also the dangerous possibility that the gravitational
power, in its natural procrastination, will still be muddling when the
Alaskan oil boom has come and gone. Unlike the Alaskan Gold Rush at
the turn of the century, the catastrophic consequences of that
contingency would appeal more to a Toffler than they would to a
London.
The father of modern geopolitics, Sir Halford
Mackinder, was a bit premature when in 1904 he
identified as the world's 'pivot area' the
place where Eurasian rivers drain into the
icebound Arctic Ocean. His prediction was
that this area would be linked to the Eurasian
'Heartland' through the development of
railroads and eventually air rou~~s, basically
altering overal power relations.
IV. Jurisdiction
"The lack of a clear vision by the governments of how the future
of the Arctic is to be shaped"29 i s complicated by "the increasingly
sensitive symbiotic relationship between domestic and foreign policy
considerations in the Arctic."30 If the political axion "where you
stand depends upon where you sit" were applied to the Arctic, one of
the distinct perspectives to emerge would be based on a view of the
Arctic as:
24
An area of converging zones of national juris-
diction or control belonging to the coastal
states and by that token an extension of the
national systems of public aff3Iting nationalpolicies of ocean management.
The "converging zones of national jurisdiction" in the Arctic belong
to the littoral states: Canada, the united States, the Soviet Union,
Norway, and Denmark. Unilateral action by anyone of these nations
affects the entire region because ecosystems tend to disregard
national boundaries and political agreements. Not being subject to a
regional regime like the Antarctic, the Arctic depends on unilateral,
bilateral, multilateral agreements, and (in the future hopefully) the
Law of the Sea to effectively resolve complex issues including: the
exploitation of living and non-living resources, marine pollution,
scientific research, marine transportation, and military strategy.
"Converging zones of national jurisdiction" seems to imply a regional
approach to Arctic issues, but this has hardly been the case in
practice. Instead, the littoral states often opt for the national
approach to Arctic issues. Since the U.S. Arctic borders two of the
littoral states, Canada and the Soviet Union, the national approaches
of those two nations will be addressed here.
Former Canadian Prime Minister Mackensie King once said, "Some
nations have too much history; Canada has too much geography." in
the past 15 years, the Canadians have become increasingly aware of
that portion of their geography located in the Arctic.
25
"The extension of national systems of public administration"
refers to the status of the 'Canadian' Arctic, the 'U.S.' Arctic, the
'Soviet' Arctic, etc., or the national aspect of the law of the sea in
the Arctic. It is here that the issue of Canadian sovereignty has
sought refuge, but it is the region which wi 11 sustain the impacts of
the nature and extent of the Canadian claim to sovereignty in the
Arctic. The special jurisdictional claims of Canada in the Arctic are
the result of this national approach to Arctic issues. The reasons
that Canada took the national approach can be determined by studying
U.S.-Canadian relations since WW II.
By the end of 1942, there were almost 15,000 Americans in the
Canadian North, and it was clear that President Roosevelt had, in
effect, placed Canada under the Monroe Doctrine. 3 2 The King
government, confident of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic before the
war, became alarmed. By 1946 Canada had bought back from the united
States all the installations they had built on Canadian soil for $111
million;33 but then came the cold war, and the strategic significance
of the Arctic was fully recognized. In 1954 the Distant Early Warning
(DEW) line was constructed by Canadians and Americans along the 70th
parallel, and although the Americans explicitly recognized Canadian
sovereignty in the Far North, the sovereignty was nominal, not real. 3 4
The ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile), introduced in 1957,
ended the need for a large military presence in the Arctic. The issue
of Canadian sovereignty, however, was not forgotten.
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In 1958, the U.S.S. Nautilus, the first atomic-powered submarine,
traveled under the polar ice cap from Pearl Harbor to Iceland. Again
the u.s. had challenged Canadian sovereignty, and again the Canadians
capi tulated. with the discovery of oil in the Arctic in the 1960's,
American controlled oil companies secured lucrative Canadian permits
and made huge profits selling Canadian oil. Canadian nationalism was
beginning to take hold in 1968 when the S.S. Manhattan, a reinforced
supertanker, transited the Northwest passage. 35 Although the Canadian
government offered to assist the Manhattan with Canadian icebreakers,
the u.s. government announced that a U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker
would accompany the ship. The Canadians were livid, and U.S.-Canadian
relations became sour. The U.S. subsequently refused to share with
the Canadians the research information they had accumulated on the
voyage. U.S.-Canadian relations have never been the same since, and
Canada has adjusted to a decline in American power and responsibility
with abandon in the Arctic arena. The price the United States has had
to pay for their unawareness of or indifference to the "the enormous
symbolic importance of the Arctic in the Canadian psyche,36 is the
special jurisdictional claims the Canadians have made in the region.
National claims in the Arctic went virtually unnoticed until the
discovery of vast deposits of mineral resources in Prudhoe Bay in
1968, accompanied by the technology to explore, produce, and transport
those resources to market. Unlike Antarctica, the Arctic (near the
Pole) consists of water (ice), and claims to the resources below those
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waters could not be based on occupation, which was next to impossible
even on the land in the Arctic. Instead claims were basd on
contiguity, Le., on the extension of the continental Shelf, and
especially on a variation of the concept of contiguity known as the
Arctic Sector Theory. According to the Arctic Sector Theory, " a state
whose territory lies close to the Arctic claims all land to be found
between a line extending from its eastern extremity to the North Pole
and another line extending from its western extremity to the pole." 37
lilt is doubtful that the Sector Theory represents a rule of
international law." 3 8 The area in which Canada asserts certain rights
in accordance with the Sector Theory is defined by lines extending
from 60 0W longitude to 141CW longitude with its apex at 90CN (See
Figure 8). "A formal sector claim to sovereignty over Arctic ice and
waters beyond the 12 mile territorial sea, however, has not been
made." 3 9 The Norwegians rejected the application of the sector
principle in their recognition of Canadian claims of sovereignty over
the Sverdrup Islands in 1930, and the u.S. rejected Canadian claims of
sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago which
Canada based on the Sector Theory.40 Canada has used the Sector
Theory to define areas within which it has sovereignty over all land
and the Continental Shelf, but it has not claimed the waters within
the sector. 4 1 Canada has considered using the Arctic Sector principle
as the basis for dividing the Continental Shelf between Canada and
Greenland and with the u.S. in the Beaufort Sea. The Canadians have
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used the Sector Theory less and less in their more recent attempts to
establish Arctic sovereignty, relying more on the assertion that, "the
characteristics of Arctic waters and ice give their northern regions a
distinctive status that implies special responsibilities and
rights."42
Having had better results with this approach, it is likely that
the Canadians will continue to base their claims to Arctic sovereignty
on it, although they are attempting to prove the contiguity of the
Alpha Ridge. This attempt, however, must be considered in the context
of the relevant articles of the Law of the Sea, which enchance the
prospects of their efforts. The Canadian government, perhaps real-
izing the nebulous legality of the Sector Theory, and facing renewed
challenges to its Arctic sovereignty from the united States in the
wake of the discovery of oil and gas in the region, took uncharacter-
istic, activist actions to reassert their sovereignty. It was in
these actions that the special jursidictional claims of Canada in the
Arctic were initially put forward. These actions took the forms of
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) and the assertion
that the Northwest Passage (see Figure 8) is neither a strait nor a
part of the high seas. Both events took place in 1970 as a result of
Manhatten's voyage.
The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970 established a
100 rni le zone, north of the 60 0 parallel of latitude in which the
Canadian government asserted the right to shield the waters against
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vessel-source pollution by preventing ships that did not meet certain
construction and manning requirements from transiting through Canadian
waters. The Canadian government indicated that the Act was not an
assertion of sovereignty, but the united states protested anyway. The
Canadians based their right to establish the zone on the "distinctive
characteristics of the Arctic environment," but the gradualist
implications were apparent to even the most inexperienced political
observers. This was "creeping jurisdiction" in addition to being a
special jurisdictional claim, because the Geneva Convention limited
contiguous zones to 12 miles from the baseline used to measure the
territorial sea. Later, Canada was accomodated by the united Nations'
Law of the Sea (which the Canadians signed) in Article 234 entitled
"Ice-Covered Areas:"
Coastal areas have the right to adopt and
enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations
for the prevention, reduction and control of
marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered
areas within the limits of the exclusive
economic zone, where particularly severe
climactic conditions and the presence of ice
covering such areas for most of the year
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine
environment could cause major harm to or
irreversible disturbance of the ecological
balance. Such laws and regulations shall have
due regard to navigation and the protection
and preservation of the marine environment
ba~ed on ~~e best available scientific
eVIdence.
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The united States did not sign the Law of the Sea Treaty for reasons
other than Article 234; nevertheless, they would be against the
article in principle for the same reasons they opposed the AWPPA: it
gives the Canadians sovereignty in an oblique way. Ships in transit
through the Northwest Passage would have to meet the conditions set
forth in the article which is anathema to the U.S.
The second action Canada took in 1970 to extend or assert their
sovereignty in the Arctic was to declare that the Northwest Passage is
neither an international strait nor high seas. For countries
transiting the Passage, this would mean legal restrictions and
navigational impediments. At the same time Canadians made this
declaration, they extended their territorial sea from three to twelve
miles, so it brought the Barrow and Prince of Wales Straits, both
parts of the Northwest passage, within the sovereign jurisdiction of
Canada. The purpose of this action was to insure the sovereignty of
Canada over the Northwest Passage even if other nations would not
concede the Passage as being internal waters of Canada, as the
Canadians had claimed. Canada maintained that the Northwest Passage
was not an international strait because it had not historically been
used as one for the purposes of commercial navigation. rrhe u.s,
maintained that it was. It hardly matters because "even if the waters
of the Northwest Passage were regarded as an international strait, the
provisions of Article 234 would override the rules relating to
international straits."4 4 The Canadians were prepared to defend in
. ., h t' 45depth theIr sovereIgnty In t e Arc IC.
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In addition to the special claims made by Candada in the Arctic
relating to the Arctic Sector Theory, the 12 mile territorial sea, the
100 mile contiguous zone, and the denial of the Northwest Passage as
an international strait, other special claims were made by Canada
later on the basis of the Law of the Sea. These include the Canadians
attempt to extend their sovereignty on the basis of the definition of
the Continental Shelf found in Article 76 (this attempt was briefly
mentioned earlier) and their attempts to augment their internal waters
on the basis of historic waters and the archipelagic principle.
Article 76, Paragraph 1 states:
The continental shelf of a coastal state
comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its
territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continen~~l margin does not extend
up to that distance.
Paragraph 3 of Article 76 defines the continental margin as "the
submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal state."
Paragraph 5 of Article 76 states:
The fixed points comprising the line of the
outer limits of the continental shelf on the
seabed, drawn in accordance with paragraph 4
(a) (i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350
nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from
the 2500 meter isobath, which is a lige
connecting the depth of 2500 meters.
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since the depth of much of the Arctic Ocean is less than 2500 meters
in depth, Canada has chosen to go 100 miles beyond the 2500 meter
isobath to extend its jurisdiction on "natural components of the
continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks, and
spurs" (Article 6). If the "Canadian expedition to study the Alpha
Ridge" (CESAR) determines that it is a "submarine elevation" that is
"a na tur a 1 component of the conti nenta 1 marg in," Canada wi 11 be abl e
to extend its legal continental shelf to 350 nmi along the ridge into
the Arctic Ocean in accordance with the provisions of the LOs. 48 The
potential economic results of such an extension of the continental
shelf could be enormous. Clearly, the united states will protest this
attempt by the Canadians to extend their jurisdiction in the Arctic.
Canada has claimed Hudson Bay to be historic, internal waters
which gives them complete sovereignty over the bay. On the other
hand, in Arctic waters, only the special claim to environmental
protection in accordance with Article 234 is within Canadian
jurisdiction. Using the archipelagic principle as it was established
in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case of 1951, and as it appears in
the LOS, Canada could draw baselines from her Arctic archipelagos,
vastly expanding her Arctic jurisdiction. Again, the United States
would lodge a protest.
The Law of the Sea can also be used to defend the rights of
states to travel through archipelagic straits and it promotes the
"equidistance rule" in delimiting boundaries of adjacent states.
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These articles could be used to support the united States' right of
passage through the Northwest Passage and the U.S. boundary
delimitation in the Beaufort Sea respectively. The Canadians will
probably assert the archipelagic principle to claim the entire Arctic
region some time in the future; however, Article 89, "No State may
validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty," might be used against the Canadians if it can be
determined that they are indeed subjecting the high seas to national
sovereignty.
The special jurisdictional claims of Canada in the Arctic result
from indecision, fear, gradualism, and revenge. "Canadians have not
decided which is the chief threat they need to defend themselves
against: environmental degradation, control of navigation, oil
spills, foreign use of Canadian ports, or perhaps just erosion of
their sovereignty.49 One point is clear: The United States will
acquiesce to new-found Canadian confidence, gradualistic assertions of
sovereignty, and activist assertions of sovereignty based on the the
Law of the Sea, until "escalating political crises puts into question
other fundamental elements of the relationship, such as Canadian
membership in NORAD,"50 and then the u.S. will once again test Cana-
dian resolve on these issues. The U.S. will act unilaterally (since
the Canadians signed the LOS and the u.S. did not) and then measure
the Canadian's loyalty by their willingness to follow. However, this
policy is breaking down, and a "creative and generous u.S. Arctic
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policy could well serve the larger cause of improved U.S.-Canadian
cooperation. 1I 5 ln In today's dangerously deteriorated global political
atmosphere••• it might be in the higher national-and-general-interest
to consc ious I y 'use' the Arct ic for 0 verarchi ng po lit ica I purposes. ,,5 2
If the United States had thought this way twenty years ago, we would
not have to be concerned today with special jurisdictional claims of
the Canadians in the Arctic, nor would we be concerned with the
jurisdictional claims of the Soviet Union.
Although American-Canadian failure to agree on Arctic issues is
significant, optimism for future agreement is possible; whereas, it
is far more difficult to view the U.S.-Soviet situation in the Arctic
with such a Pollyanna outlook. In fact, the caustic, biting dialogue
that sometimes characterizes meetings betwen U.S. and Canadian
officials discussing Arctic issues is healthier than the lack of
communication, the agreement to disagree, and the unilateral, covert
military and economic actions that characterize U.S.-Soviet relations
in the Arctic. The potential for a conflagration between the U.S. and
soviets beginning in the Arctic is real, and if Mackinder's words were
prophetic so too might Robert Frosts' be:
Some say the world will end in fire,
Some say in ice.
From what I've tasted of desire
I hold with those who favor fire.
But if it had to perish twice,
I think I know enough of hate
To say that for destruction ice
Is also great
And would suffice. 5 3
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Like the U.S.-Canadian disagreements, the U.S.-Soviet disagree-
ments are old and relate to the relative importance of the Arctic, an
issue earlier raised. William Henry Seward, Secretary of State under
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson, thought that Alaska was valuable
enough to offer the Russians $7.2 million for it in 1867, while Baron
Edouard de Stoeckl was so unimpressed with the Arctic that he accepted
the offer on behalf of the Russians. Although Seward was mocked in
some circles for his largesse with U.S. funds--the territory was
referred to as "Seward's i cebo x" and "Sewa r d l s fo llylt--and the Baron
was lauded, there is little doubt today that Seward was sagacious and
Stoeckl was stupid. Perhaps the Russians learned from their mistake,
because as we approach the twenty-first century, the Sewards and the
Stoeckls seem to have reversed positions as to the importance of the
Arctic region.
ItSoviet claims in the Arctic (as elsewhere) have been expansive
yet seldom official. They have been contradictory at times and
frequently ambiguous."S4 The Arctic chill is warm in comparison to the
chill in U.S.-Soviet relations witnessed during the Andropov and
Reagan Administrations and it appears that the chill will continue
during the Chernenko and Reagan years to come. One thing is clear:
The United States and the Soviet Union have designs on the Arctic;
they are aware of the strategic and economic significance of the
region, and they are presently acting unilaterally to enchance their
positions in anticipation of future negotations or future conflicts.
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What exactly are the jurisdictional problems between the two
superpowers in relation to their backyards in the Arctic Ocean and
more specifically in the Bering Sea? The Nararin Basin in the Bering
Sea (See Figure 9) is expected to be one of the richest oil-producing
areas in the u.S. Arctic. It was included in Lease Sale No. 83 in
March, 1984. The Basin straddles the boundary between the Soviet
union and the united States in the Bering Sea. There are other lease
tracts in the Bering Sea scheduled for sale (Norton Basin--November,
1982, October, 1985, and March, 1986 and the Barrow Arch, February,
1985 and February, 1987--See Figure 9) which present equally distur-
bing dilemmas for the Americans and the Soviets in terms of inter-
national law and national security. The two superpowers are unable to
agree on how to measure their boundaries in the Bering Sea, and in the
absence of such an agreement, the U.S. will be unable to lease areas
in questions there. 55
The united States and the Soviet union are both parties to the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, thereby entitled
to exploit their outer continental shelves' non-living resources in
the Bering Strait out to the boundary line. Provisions in the 1958
Convention give the coastal state exclusive rights to explore for an
exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf including:
The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of
the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitatio~ of the natural resources of the
said areas. 6
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Proclamation 5030 of March 10, 1983 establishing the exclusive econo-
mic zone of the U.S., signed by President Reagan, unilaterally pro-
vides for economic jurisdiction of the seabed, subsoil, and super-
adjacent waters out to 200 nautical miles even when the continental
shelf does not extend that far.
The Genev¢a Convention and the Law of the Sea (the latter of
which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are not parties to) contain provisions
whereby States whose coasts are opposite each other may delimit their
common OCS areas by agreeing to an equidistance test, but this test
only applies "in the absence of agreement justified by special
c i r cums t ance s.v V The United States-Russia Convention of 1867 provides
just such an agreement, so it is that agreement which should determine
the boundary between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the Bering Sea. 5 8
The Treaty of 1867 defines the delimitation in the Bering Sea as
follows:
The western (U.S.) 1 imi t wi thin which the
territories and dominion conveyed, are
contained passes through a point in Behring's
straits on the parallel of sixty-five degrees
thirty minutes north latitude, at its
intersection by the meridian which passes
midway between the islands of Krusenstern, or
Ignalook, and the island of Ratmanoff, or
Noonarbook, and proceeds due north, without
limitation into the same frozen ocean. The
same western limit, beginning at the same
initial point, proceeeds thence in a course
nearly southwest, through Behring's straits
and Behring's sea, so as to pass midway
between the northwest point of the island of
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St. Lawrence and the southeast point of Cape
Choukotski, to the meridian of one hundred
seventy two west longitude; thence, from the
intersection of that meridian, in a
southwesterly direction, so as to pass midway
between the island of Attou and the Copper
Island of the Kormandorski couplet or group in
the North Pacific ocean, to the meridian of
one hundred and ninety-three degrees west
longitude, so as to include in the territory
conveyed the whole of ~~e Aleutian Islands
east of that meridian.
The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both officially accept the 1867
Convention line for fishery-zone delimitation, and neither country
wants to renegotiate the line which can be supported as a boundary
relying on customary international law. It would appear then that
both countries agree that the 1867 line also delimits the Continental
Shelf, and theoretically they do, except that they disagree as to how
to draw the line. The united States uses the "great circle" method to
draw the line, while the Soviet Union uses the "rhumb line" method.
The rhumb line method was said to be used at the time the treaty was
signed; the great circle method is the modern method of measuring the
line. The difference in area between the methods used to draw the
line is approximately 15,000 square miles of ocean bottom with an
excellent chance of containing a tremendous amount of oil. The dif-
ference in area between the two methods (and the Convention line as
opposed to the equidistance line) is shown in Figure 10. 60
There have been many suggestions made, primarily by
representatives from the oil industry, to establish an interim regime,
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perhaps a buffer zone, to "permit exploration and provide the
framework for future development and the sharing of petroleum
resources.,,6l The united states could have, and should have, used
their superior technology in oil exploration and development as a
bargaining chip in exchange for drawing the boundary line using the
great circle method. Instead, the u.s. is giving the technology away
for free, passively watching the Soviets steal it, or witnessing their
NATO allies handing it over to Russia. Now, in the interests of
profit, the petroleum industry calls for sharing costs and profits
with the Soviets in joint oil operations in the Bering Sea. This
suggestion is idealist and it neglects to consider national security
in this extremely important strategic region.
Despite the Convention on the Continental Shelf, which outlaws
use of the seabed for military purposes, both the u.S. and the
U.S.S.R. have deployed new surveillance systems, submarines, and
nuclear missiles in the North Polar Region in the race for military
superiority there. "'Right now,' says Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska,
'it's sort of a tinderbox of the world.,"62 The United States in the
context of the strategic vying for position between themselves and the
Russians, is not amenable to establishing a platform which the Soviets
could use for reasons other than economic. Neither is the Reagan
Administration anxious to transfer technology which could be applied
for military purposes. Although negotiations between the u.S. and
U.S.S.R. regarding the great circle, rhumb line disagreement have
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taken place and have been optimistic in tone, they
have been confused by the fact that the united
States and apparently the Soviet Union have
not been able to locate a map made contempor-
aneously with the 1867 Treaty which evidenced
t~e m~~ual intent of the parties as of that
t i me ,
You can be sure that neither country will look too hard for a map, the
exposure of which will cost it 15,000 square miles of prime sea-bottom
real estate.
There is little reason to believe that the boundary dispute in
the Bering Sea will be successfully negotiated in the near future;
however, the prospects of that happening are more likely than the
prospects of successful negotiations resolving the boundary dispute in
the Arctic where there is an adjacent state, lateral boundary
s i tua t i on.
The original Convention Language stated that
the line 'proceeds thence due north without
limitation, into the same frozen ocean. Since
the United States does not support so-called
'sector claims' in the polar regions, the
northernnmost point for the representation of
the conveotion line was agreed to be
72 000'N.,64
There is irony in the fact that the u.S. stands to gain by applying
the sector rule which, historically, they have opposed. The Soviets
have not pushed the sector claim in this instance; in fact, no
substantial negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have taken
place to date on the Arctic boundary issue.
46
The possibility also exists that the Soviet Union will attempt,
as Canada is presently doing, to extend its legal continental shelf
limit out to 350 miles if the opposite side of the ridge which forms
the northwesterly extension of Ellesmere Island can be legally defined
as a submarine elevation that is a natural component of the
continental margin. 6 5 Unless or until the Soviet Union becomes a party
to the Law of the Sea Convention, it is unlikely that it will pursue
this approach to extend its Arctic jurisdiction.
Wrangel Island (see Figure 10) presents another potential
jurisdictional problem between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Both
countries claim the island. Although a U.S. explorer first discovered
the island in 1881, the U.S. did not occupy the island and occupation
is required, according to international law, to establish national
sovereignty over a "terra nulius." The U.S. has not claimed sovereig-
nty over the island since 1924, despite the fact that the Soviets base
their claim to the island on the Sector Theory.66 While the Sector
Theory has no basis in international law, acquiescence on the part of
the U.S. is tantamount to recognition of Soviet sovereignty according
to international law. It is unlikely that the United States will
press the issue.
How should United States policymakers approach the jurisdictional
issues between the Americans and their littoral neighbors in the
Arctic? The U.S.-U.S.S.R. jurisdictional conflicts in the Arctic are
complex and cooperation during this period of strained relations
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appears limited. Nevertheless, the united states should continue to
negotiate with the Soviets, but not on an idealistic plane where one-
sided U.S. concessions benefit the Soviet Union while no appreciable
returns accrue to the u.s. In the interim, it is imperative that the
United States take immediate steps to establish themselves as the
leader among the littoral nations of the Arctic, actively engaging in
bilateral (U.S.-Canada) and multilateral (U.S., Canada, Norway,
Denmark) agreements whose object it is to assist our allies in the
region, while isolating our foe. This suggestion assumes a typically
insincere and one-sided approach to Arctic issues on the Soviet's
part. If the Soviets, on the other hand, are genuinely willing to
negotiate common interests, they too would be welcome to participate
in regional negotiations and agreements.
Instead of resisting increased economic
interdependence, we should be embracing it
wholeheartedly •.. it is our great hope for
peace. If we get sufficiently interlaced
economically, we wi 11 most probably ~~t bomb
each other off the face of the planet.
Unfortunately, the Soviets have chosen to do just that. What is more
unfortunate, however, is that Americans have followed suit, ostensibly
because "in international affairs. reciprocity remains the basis
of the rule of law."69 This policy, which is questionable in its
logic, is largely responsible not only for the present "cold war" with
the Soviets, but also for chilled relations with the Canadians who are
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u.s. friends and NATO allies. unilateral actions by the U.S. in the
Arctic arena also alienate Norway and Denmark/Greenland. They too are
NATO allies.
Instead of playing war games under the polar ice with their
soviet adversaries in defiance of international law, the U.S. should
embark on a policy designed to increase their knowledge of the Arctic
region where
The starting place has to be a confession of
almost total ignorance on the part of most
laymen other than a handful of Arctic
explorers, scientists, air force and naval
specialists, and oil and mineral prospectors.
These specialists know a great deal about the
sub ject.
7
The rest of us know practically
nothing. a
using a "knowledge theory of value" in the Arctic in a post-
industrial but pre-informational economy to help obtain petroleum
which fueled the obsolete industrial economy is unmistakably ironic,
nevertheless, insightful. But the United States appears to have
abandoned this approach to Arctic affairs. Congress has closed the
Naval Arctic Research Laboratory near Point Barrow, Alaska and failed
to pass the Arctic Research and Policy Act.
One major problem requiring national
commitment for solution remains. We do not
have the knowledge necessary to achieve the
results toward which these political forces
drive toward. Surely the Congress •••
recognizing the importance of these
forces • • . , must now agree that a political
recognition of the means for achievement
through scientific research and technological
innovation is essential. On the international
front, too, knowledge is essential to the
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resolution of law-of-the-sea questions and
jur~sd~rtional limitations in the Arctic
basIn.
The united States' Arctic policy, once established, must be
oriented toward the long term, simply because education (research)
from which we obtain knowledge, takes time.
To be able to exploit Arctic resources,
legally, economically, and in an environ-
mentally acceptable fashion; to conduct
military operations in the area; and to
represent its interests in the Arctic
intelligently and from an informed basis, the
united States must have a substantial and
well-coordinated scientific research program
in the Arctic. Such a program does not
presently exist, neither does a coherent
policy on Arctic research nor any priority
sense of purpose. Consequently, the united
States has only very limited Arctic scientific
and technological expertise and capability.
Only a strong, stable, long-term science
effort can supply the answers needed now and
to, tra~n a 92neration of future Arctic
sCIentIsts.
Eventually, this information could be shared with all the
littoral states once an Arctic regime is established. For the
present, it could be shared with those countries with whom we have
engaged in bilateral agreements.
Clearly, the time for a renaissance in Arctic
science is now. We need a strong and cohesive
u.S. Arctic science policy to guide national
program effort in resource development,
international relations, defense,
environmental protection, and human health.?3
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Although U.S. credibility with its Arctic allies would be
enhanced by its becoming a party to the Law of the Sea Convention,
this remote possibility is not a prerequisite for a successful U.S.
Arctic pol icy. It is more important that U.S. policy goals are
perceived among its Arctic allies as being unselfish. The present
U.S. Arctic policy of benign neglect under the guise of allowing the
free market to operate unimpeded by government intervention is clearly
unacceptable if the United States is to regain its status in the
Arctic region.
In trying to think constructively yet
realistically about this last unmanaged
frontier, we can be humbled by the knowledge
that, here as elsewhere, science and
technology run far ah7~d of our feeble
political capacities.
Cooperation between government, science, and industry, coupled
with a realistic foreign policy which dispenses with the delusion that
the Arctic is unimportant, and altruistic in its recognition of the
policies of the other littoral states, will establish U.S.
technological superiority in the Arctic region. Such a policy of
affirmation, unencumbered by narrow self-interest, will improve U.S.-
Canadian relations and enhance the possibility of U.S.-Soviet
cooperation in the Arctic.
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